In this paper we develop tests for whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are unobserved. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither. Further, we discuss the relevance of the test outcomes for rationalization of data by multiple preference profiles.
INTRODUCTION
How can one test whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium when we cannot observe the players' preferences? As a number of recent papers (Zhou 1997 (IC) and Subgame Consistency (SC)) for a data set to be rationalizable as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in every reduced game form.
We are interested in the differences between Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games. Notice that in extensive game forms, we assume we observe outcomes and not strategies (complete plans of actions), whereas in the work on normal game forms, strategies (equivalently, actions) are assumed to 2 be observed. Thus a data set in the extensive form context has missing observations compared to the corresponding normal form data set. Therefore, one cannot use Sprumont's conditions for Nash rationalization in extensive game forms by testing the conditions in the corresponding normal game forms. To see this, consider the data set from the game tree (and all reduced forms) as in Figure 1a . The tree has two choice nodes; player 1 moves in the first node and has two choices, namely L and R. Player 2 moves in the second (after player 1 moves L) and also has two choices, namely l and r. There are 3 possible (non-trivial) reduced game forms as shown in the figure.
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here]
The corresponding normal game form obviously has a 2x2 structure as shown in Figure 1b . There are 4 possible (non-trivial) reduced normal forms. Clearly, if we observe the outcomes in the trees G, G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 , we do not observe player 2's choice of action when player 1 chooses to play R in the corresponding normal game form G 4 .
It is indeed possible to observe data on extensive game forms that are not rationalizable by subgame-perfect equilibrium, yet can still be rationalized as Nash behavior. Consider for example the following two distinct data sets, as described in Figures 2a and 2b , on the same game trees as in Figure 1a .
[Insert Figures 2a and 2b here]
Neither of these data sets satisfies the subgame consistency condition of Ray and Zhou and therefore cannot be rationalized as a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The data in Figure 2a , however, can be rationalized by a Nash equilibrium.
The choice of player 1 to play R in the game form G can be justified as a Nash behavior on his part that assumes that player 2 would play r (although actually, player 2 prefers to play l when given the choice).
1 The data in Figure 2b cannot be rationalized even by Nash equilibrium as there is no choice of player 2 that would justify player 1's choice of playing R in the game form G.
Also, notice that, under the (revealed) preferences that rationalize the outcomes in Figure 2a , the game G has multiple Nash equilibria. There is a Nash equilibrium (indeed, subgame-perfect) outcome (L, l) in the game, which however, is not observed, as we assume that only one outcome is observed in each reduced game form.
We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition for partial Nash rationalization; i.e., we rationalize the data in each reduced game as one of the possibly multiple Nash equilibria. For each game form G , we consider strategies that are consistent with the observed outcome in the reduced game. If there exist strict preferences such that any one of these strategies can be shown to be a best response for each player i, given that the other players' strategies are fixed, then clearly the observed outcome is consistent with a Nash equilibrium outcome. This motivates our necessary and sufficient condition, called Extensive Form Consistency, which compares the outcomes of a set of reduced extensive form games, varying the set of feasible strategies for one player while the other players' strategies are fixed. For example, in the data in figure 2b , there are two strategies consistent with the given outcome in the game form G, namely, (R, l) and (R, r); if we fix player 2's strategy at either l or r, we see from the outcomes of the reduced games G 2 and G 3 , that player 1 prefers to play L. Our extensive form consistency is not satisfied here and R cannot be rationalized as Nash behavior in game G. In the data set in figure 2a , the condition is satisfied and the outcome in game G can be rationalized using the strategy profile (R, r), as from G 3 , player 1 prefers to play R.
We then provide a condition, Subgame-Perfect Consistency, which uses observations of reduced game outcomes that are proper subgames below a node with at least one active player other than the one at that node, to ensure that the strategies played are not only Nash but are also consistent with subgame-perfect behavior. The data set in figure 2a does not satisfy this condition because player 2 is active in G 1 , which is a proper subgame of G, and is observed to move l; under this circumstance, we know from G 2 , player 1 prefers L to R. Thus the outcome R in G violates subgame-perfect consistency.
Subgame-perfect consistency together with extensive form consistency are necessary and sufficient for subgame-perfect equilibrium rationalization. Therefore, these two conditions together are equivalent to the three conditions proposed by Ray and Zhou. The advantage however is that our conditions can be used to test for Nash alone and also to distinguish between Nash and subgameperfect behavior.
Our conditions are also constructed in such a way that violations of these conditions refer specifically to players and nodes. Checking these conditions can help identify the players and the nodes where subgame-perfect or Nash behavior are not observed. Thus even though the data come from a collective choice situation of a multi-player game, we can recover information about individual rationality. This could be relevant to obtain results to rationalize observed outcomes using other notions of rationality such as multiple rationales (Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler, 2002) . We discuss this further in our concluding section.
ANALYSIS

Model
We study n-person extensive form games with perfect information. The structure is identical to that in Ray and Zhou (2001) . We therefore maintain their terminologies and the notations as much as possible.
An extensive game form G is a finite rooted tree with set of nodes, X, with a distinct initial node x 0 , and a precedence function p : The set of non-terminal nodes, X/Z, are partitioned into n subsets, {X 1 , X 2 ,..., X n }, where X i , called the player i's partition, is the set of nodes at which player i moves; player i's moves determine one y ∈ s(x) for each x ∈ X i . A pure strategy t i for player i specifies a unique choice at each node in X i . The set of pure strategies available to player i is T i .
Definition 1 A reduced extensive game form G of an extensive game form G is an extensive game form consisting of (i) terminal nodes Z ⊆ Z and (ii) all the non-terminal nodes that belong to
Thus, any set of terminal nodes Z uniquely refers to the reduced game form G . As with G, the set of non-terminal nodes in G can also be partitioned into n many player-partitions, {X 1 ,..., X n }.
Let Γ be the set of all possible reduced extensive game forms of an extensive game form G.
Player i is active in any (reduced) game form G if X i is non-empty with at least one node x ∈ X i such that |s(x)| ≥ 2.
Definition 2 For each reduced extensive game form G and a non-terminal node x ∈ X /Z , the subgame form beginning at x, G x , is the reduced extensive game form consisting of (i) terminal nodes Z (x) = Z ∩ S(x) and (ii) all the non-terminal nodes that belong to ρ(z ) for any z ∈ Z ∩ S(x).
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A pure strategy t i for player i in G specifies a unique choice of an immediate successor y ∈ s(x) at each node x in X i . The set of pure strategies available to
For any (reduced) extensive game form G a strategy profile t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) determines an outcome Ω(t ) = z , where Ω : Clearly, a strategy-reduced extensive game form G is a reduced game form (of the original game G). 3 Starting from G ∈ Γ and a fixed strategy profile t , we then look at a set of strategy-reduced extensive game forms in which the other players' strategies are fixed, while varying the set of feasible strategies for player k maintaining the strategy t k feasible.
Definition 4 For any G ∈ Γ and the corresponding pure strategy sets
< T 1 , . . . , T n >, given a t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) where t i ∈ T i ,
and a particular player k, an individuallystrategy-reduced extensive game form G (t , k) is a strategy-reduced extensive
game form with t k ∈ T k ⊆ T k , and T j = t j for all j = k.
Definition 5 A binary individually-strategy-reduced extensive game form G (t , k; 2)
is an individually-strategy-reduced extensive game form consisting of |Z | = 2.
Suppose each player i has preferences over Z described as a strict ordering Q * i over Z. Let the players play reduced games G (Q * ) for every G ∈ Γ. Let O : Γ → Z be the outcome function. We observe O(G ) ∈ Z and thus the unique path ρ(O(G )) for every G ∈ Γ. We do not observe strategies; thus players' intended moves off the path cannot be observed.
3 Another way to look at the strategy-reduced extensive game forms is to consider the corresponding normal form representations. Formally, from a reduced extensive game form G one can uniquely define a normal game form H as the set of players (1, . . . , n), the set of strategies for each player T i , and the function Ω : (t 1 , . . . , t n ) → Z . A reduced normal game form H of a normal game form H consists of a list < T 1 , . . . , T n > of nonempty subsets T i ⊆ T i for all i and the corresponding outcomes Ω(t ). From every H one can then uniquely define a corresponding extensive game form G defined by Z ⊆ Z with z ∈ Z iff z = Ω(t ) for some t ∈< T 1 , ..., T n >. 
Definition 6 An outcome function
O(G (t * , i; 2)) = z .
Condition 2 subgame-perfect Consistency (SPC): For each game G , consider each non-terminal node
x ∈ X /Z such that x ∈ ρ(O(G )) with player i such that x ∈ X i . For each non-terminal node y ∈ s(x) such that (i) y / ∈ ρ(O(G ),
and (ii) there is at least one active player other than
i in G y , O(O(G ), O(G y )) = O(G ).
Revealed Preferences
Given an outcome function O, following Ray and Zhou (2001), one can construct incomplete preference orderings for players over the terminal nodes. Consider the paths that lead to two different terminal nodes u and v. Take the player i who has to play at the node where these two paths diverge. Player i's preference over u and v can be determined by his choice in the reduced game form G which has only two terminal nodes, u and v. This incomplete order, P i , for player i, is known as the revealed base relation. Formally, for any u, v ∈ Z, let x be the node at which the paths to u and v diverge. If x ∈ X i , then uP i v if and only 
Lemma 2 An acyclic base relation can be extended to a strict ordering on Z which is complete and acyclic (equivalently, transitive, for a complete ordering)
for each player i. 
Results
Theorem 1 XC is necessary and sufficient for partial Nash rationalization in
strict preferences.
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Proof. Necessity is straightforward and hence we only show sufficiency here.
From the previous lemmas we know that if XC is satisfied, we can define a complete transitive strict ordering Q i on Z for all i that is consistent with the base preference relation P i . We will show, for each game G , there exists a strategy profile such that the outcome corresponding to the profile is the observed outcome O(G ) and that the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game G (Q). We know, for each game G , there exists a t * = (t * 1 , . . . , t * n ) with t * i ∈ T i for all i and Ω(t * ) = O(G ) satisfying XC. If every player follows this strategy, then the outcome is O(G ). Let us show that these strategies indeed constitute a Nash equilibrium for every G . Suppose any player i deviates and plays any other strategy t i to induce a different outcome z . By XC, the outcome of the binary individually-strategy-reduced extensive game form G (t * , i; 2) with
Hence, by the revealed base relation, z P i z implying z Q i z .
Therefore player i cannot deviate and be better off.
Theorem 2 XC and SPC together are necessary and sufficient for full rationalization by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in strict preferences.
Proof. Once again, necessity is straightforward and hence we only show sufficiency here. From the previous theorem we know that for each game G , there exists a t * = (t * 1 , . . . , t * n ) with t * i ∈ T i for all i and Ω(t * ) = O(G ) that constitutes a Nash equilibrium for every G . We will prove that these outcomes coincide with the outcomes of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that can be constructed using the complete transitive revealed strict ordering Q i as in Lemma 2. Suppose this is not true. Then there must exist a reduced game G in which there exists a node x such that these outcomes do not constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium for the subgame form beginning at x, G x , but they do for G w , for all w ∈ s(x). For, if such an x does not exist, we would be able to find an infinite sequence of nodes {x k } with x k = p(x k+1 ), for each k, which contradicts the assumption that the game always ends. Suppose at G x , player i is active, that is, x ∈ X i . As play at G x is not subgame-perfect but is for all subgames succeeding x, then it must be true that, given Q i , player i can deviate at x from the outcome path ρ(O(G )) and obtain an outcome that he prefers to 
Therefore, again by the revealed base relation, player i cannot deviate and be better off. 
REMARKS
In this paper we provide separate testable restrictions for Nash and subgameperfect equilibrium. One possible criticism of our test for Nash behavior could be that the restrictions are described over observable outcomes and unobservable strategies. Note that, however, for the class of games we consider, the set of unobservable strategies that are consistent with an observed outcome is finite.
Thus the tests can be carried out in finite time for a given data set. Tests of this form have been used in the previous literature. For example, Diewert and Parkan (1985) developed nonparametric tests that require checking whether there exists a real solution to a (linear) programming problem defined over observed and unobserved variables.
Consistency
To understand the XC condition, it is useful to first look at the following two mutually exclusive consistency conditions. IIC is a condition relating to the internal consistency of an individual player.
Condition 3 Game Internal Consistency (GIC): For any
T i = T i , O(G (t * , i)) = z .
Condition 4 Individual Internal Consistency (IIC): For any
Given Condition 3, this is essentially condition α of individual choice theory (Sen, 1971) . Thus the observed outcome that results from player i's strategy does not change based on other "irrelevant" strategies available to himself.
For (partial) Nash rationalization, we require the existence of a strategy profile that corresponds to the observed outcome in every reduced game, such that GIC and IIC are satisfied. For our purpose, it suffices to check consistency defined over binary reduced games only, as formulated in XC.
Comparison with Ray and Zhou (2001)
Our two conditions (XC and SPC) together are clearly equivalent to Ray and Zhou's three conditions (AC, IC and SC). As Lemma 1 shows, our XC implies AC. XC implies neither IC nor SC. There are however some data sets -in which either IC or SC is violated and therefore the data set cannot be rationalized as subgame-perfect -where XC is also violated and the data set cannot be rationalized even as Nash. One such example has been illustrated in Figure 2b where SC and XC are violated. The data set in Figure 3 on the same game tree violates IC and XC.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
If a data set suffers from any violation of IC or SC involving only either (i)
off-the-path terminal nodes or (ii) subgames below a node with only one active player who is the same player at that node, then it is easy to show that XC is also violated in the data set, by considering the binary individually-strategy-reduced extensive game forms.
For all other types of violations of IC or SC, the data set may be rationalized as Nash as XC is satisfied. The data set in Figure 2a satisfies XC but violates SC.
Consider the game form G and the (partial) data set in Figure 4 that violates IC but satisfies XC. Such an outcome clearly is not subgame-perfect but can be justified as Nash.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Our SPC considers only off-the-path non-terminal nodes and subgames below a node with at least one active player other than the one at that node.
Clearly SPC is violated in the data set in Figures 2a and 4. 
Individual Choice Problems; Multiple Rationales
Consider the game tree as in Figure 5 (similar to the previous figures), however, view it as an individual choice problem with the choice set as the set of terminal nodes in G for every G ∈ Γ.
[Insert Figure 5 [Insert Figure 6 here]
Clearly, this naive interpretation of Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler's result does not hold as we know there are data sets, with two different players at two different choice nodes in the game tree, that do not satisfy our conditions and therefore cannot be rationalized. This is due to two reasons. The first is the dynamic structure of the game tree. The second is that by using the structure of the game, we place a restriction on the assignment of the two different preferences to the choice sets while Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler can assign the two preferences freely over the choice sets.
We might still want to use the concept of multiple rationales if we cannot rationalize the data with one preference ordering for each player, i.e., when the conditions for Nash or subgame-perfection are violated in a multi-player game.
Consider the example again in Figures 2a and 2b . In Figure 2b , play is not consistent with subgame-perfect or Nash equilibrium, as condition XC is violated. It is the play of player 1 at the first node that leads to the violation of XC; player 1's choice in game G to play R is not consistent with the outcomes of games G 2 and G 3 , where player 1 plays L. Thus we can unambiguously identify player 1 as the "inconsistent player" of this game. We can rationalize this data set by assigning two preference orderings for player 1 (with one ordering for player 2).
On the other hand, in Figure 2a player 1 is playing optimally in game G by playing R if he believes that player 2 is playing r, and condition XC is satisfied.
The play is not subgame-perfect however. Here we cannot unambiguously define an "inconsistent player"; in the game G, either player 1 or player 2 is playing in a way that is not consistent with our observations of G 1 and G 2 . There are two ways to implement different rationales to justify the data. We can assign two preference orderings for player 1 (with one ordering for player 2) or two preference orderings for player 2 (with one ordering for player 1).
These observations suggest a further use of our conditions for Nash and subgame-perfect behavior beyond testing. The violation of these conditions can also provide information that we can use to form beliefs about the consistency of individual decision making within games, and thereby rationalize outcomes with alternative hypotheses of behavior such as multiple preference orderings.
It would be interesting to find general results analogous to Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2002) in this context.
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